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⇕  Format Kindle Read [ 〸 America's War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History ] For Free ⧇ Kindle By Andrew J Bacevich ⧑ ⇕ Format Kindle Read [ 〸 America's War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History ] For Free ⧇ Kindle By Andrew J Bacevich ⧑ 1War of ChoiceFrom the outset, Americas War for the Greater Middle East was a war to preserve the American way of life, rooted in a specific understanding of freedom and requiring an abundance of cheap energy In that sense, just as the American Revolution was about independence and the Civil War was about slavery, oil has always defined the raison dtre of the War for the Greater Middle East Over time, other considerations intruded and complicated the wars conduct, but oil as a prerequisite of freedom was from day one an abiding consideration.As a young man I required no instruction in that relationship, whose sweetness I had tasted at first hand In June 1969, a newly commissioned shavetail fresh out of West Point, I was home on leave courting the girl who was to become my wife She lived on Chicagos South Side My mother lived in northwest Indiana.Every evening I drove my brand new Mustang Mach I candy apple red with black piping into Chicago to see my beloved and then in the early morning hours returned home Before each trip, I stopped at a service station to top off Ten gallons at 29.9 cents per gallon usually sufficed The three bucks werent trivial a second lieutenants pay came to 343 per month before taxes importantly, before the monthly car payment but the expense took a backseat to romance I do not recall wondering where the gas came from Texas California nor about how much there was Like most Americans, I took it for granted that the supply was inexhaustible All I knew for sure was that with four years of West Point behind me and Vietnam just ahead, life behind the wheel of a pony car in the summer of 1969 was pretty good.It is easy to disparage this version of freedom, as postwar social critics from C Wright Mills and David Riesman to William Whyte and Vance Packard had already done and others would do For the ostensibly alienated and apathetic citizens of postwar America, trapped in a soul deadening new universe of management and manipulation, as Mills put it, freedom had become little than synthetic excitement.1Maybe so Yet whatever the merit of that critique, it never made much of a dent in the average Americans aspirations The American way of life may have been shallow and materialistic, its foundation a bland conformity But even for people of modest means, the exercise of American style freedom did not lack for pleasures and satisfactions.As with the smell of a new car, those pleasures tended to be transitory But an unspoken premise underlying that way of life was that there was still to come, Americans preferring to measure freedom quantitatively More implied bigger and better Yet few of those driving or coveting the latest made in Detroit gas guzzler appreciated just how precarious such expectations might be.As I sped off to Chicago each evening, with radio and AC blasting, the gasoline in my tank was increasingly likely to come from somewhere other than a stateside oilfield In 1969, imports already accounted for 20 percent of the 15 million barrels that Americans consumed daily The very next year U.S domestic oil production peaked at nearly 12 million barrels per day, thereafter beginning a decline that continued through the remainder of the century and appeared irreversible The proportion of oil coming from abroad increased accordingly Within a decade, imports of foreign oil had reached 8 million barrels per day.2By 1973, even I was obliged to take notice That fall, in retaliation for the U.S supporting Israel in the October War, Arabs suspended oil exports to the United States and the West The impact of the embargo was immediate and severe The resulting oil shortage all but paralyzed the U.S economy and produced widespread alarm among Americans suddenly deprived of the mobility that they now considered their birthright Oil had become a weapon, wielded by foreigners intent on harming Americans Here, it seemed, coming out of nowhere, was a direct existential threat to the United States.With the crisis inducing another eyeball to eyeball confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger announced that U.S forces were on alert, pending their possible deployment to the Middle East At the time, I was a captain, stationed at Fort Bliss, Texas, alongside El Paso and just across from Mexico The regiment in which I served had war plans to deploy to West Germany to participate in NATOs defense of Western Europe If required, we probably could have occupied Juarez But we had no plans to fight in the Persian Gulf, whether to thwart a threatened Soviet intervention there or to seize Arab oil fields.3 The very notion seemed preposterous At the time it was Not for long, however.Fortunately, no such deployment occurred, the immediate emergency passed, and oil imports from the Persian Gulf eventually resumed Yet the availability and price of gasoline had now become and thereafter remained a matter of national concern Even as Americans were learning to live with nuclear weapons the prospect of a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union now appearing theoretical than real they were also learning that they could not live without oil Ever so subtly, the hierarchy of national security priorities was beginning to shift.As an immediate response to the crisis, the Nixon administration hastily cobbled together a plan that promised, in the presidents words, to insure that by the end of this decade, Americans will not have to rely on any source of energy beyond our own Project Independence, Nixon called it The immediate emphasis was on conservation Details of what the government intended beyond urging Americans to save were vague, Nixon simply vowing that we will once again have plentiful supplies of energy, with the energy crisis resolved not only for our time but for all time.4This did not occur, of course, but Nixons vision persisted The nations political agenda now incorporated the goal of energy independence as one of those must do items that somehow never get done, like simplifying the tax code or reducing cost overruns on Pentagon weapons programs.The idea persisted because it had broad popular appeal Yet in some quarters, the larger policy implications of pursuing energy independence did not sit well The very effort implied retrenchment or giving in This was not the way the world was supposed to work in the latter half of the twentieth century Rather than the United States accom modating others in this case, the newly empowered Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries OPEC , with its largely Arab membership others were expected to accommodate the United States.As an outgrowth of this dissatisfaction, the notion that American military muscle might provide a suitable corrective began to insinuate itself into the policy debate Writing in the January 1975 issue of Commentary, for example, the noted political scientist Robert W Tucker bemoaned Washingtons apparent unwillingness even to consider the possibility of armed intervention in the Arab world If the present situation goes on unaltered, Tucker warned, a disaster resembling the 1930s beckoned To insist that before using force one must exhaust all other remedies, when the exhaustion of all other remedies is little than the functional equivalent of accepting chaos was therefore the height of folly When it came to something as important as oil, the putative lessons of the recently concluded Vietnam War simply didnt apply Tucker wanted policymakers to get serious about the possibility of using force in the Middle East.5Two months later, in Harpers, the pseudonymous but apparently well connected Miles Ignotus went a step further, outlining in detail a plan to seize Saudi oil fields outright Four divisions plus an air force contingent, with Israel generously pitching in to help, would do the trick, he argued Echoing Tucker, Ignotus categorized spineless American leaders alongside the craven men of Munich Allowing OPEC to dictate the price of oil amounted to a futile policy of appeasement and would inevitably lead to further disasters.6 In contrast, forceful military action promised an easy and nearly risk free solution.Ignotus was actually Edward Luttwak, well known national security gadfly and Pentagon consultant In positing a U.S attack on Saudi oil fields, he was pursuing an agenda that looked far beyond mere energy security Luttwak was part of group seeking to revolutionize warfare Saudi Arabia, he and his like minded colleagues believed, offered the prospect of demonstrating the feasibility of using fast, light forces to penetrate the enemys vital centers, thereby providing a shortcut to victory This was an early version of what twenty years later became known as the Revolution in Military Affairs The invasion of Iraq in 2003, Luttwak would later claim, signified the accomplishment of that revolution.7Along with a strikingly strident tone, a strong sense of entitlement pervaded both essays That Americans might submit to the political blackmail of the kings and dictators of Araby, Ignotus wrote, in order to ensure access to a product Arabs had neither made nor found represented an affront Sure, the vast petroleum reserves were located on their territory But for Tucker and Ignotus, that fact qualified as incidental at best Middle East oil properly belonged to those who had discovered, developed, and actually needed it By all rights, therefore, it was ours, a perspective that resonated with many ordinary Americans All that was required to affirm those rights was the vigorous use of U.S military power.Notably absent from this analysis, however, was any appreciation for context Tucker and Ignotus alike showed no interest in the recent history of the Middle East They ignored the dubious legacy of previous Western interventionism, especially by Great Britain, until recently the regions imperial overlord That the United States was willy nilly supplanting the British as the dominant power in the Arab world and broadly in the Greater Middle East ought to have given Americans pause After all, the lessons to be taken from the British experience were almost entirely cautionary ones That was not a baton that the Americans were grasping but a can of worms.More astonishingly still, neither Tucker nor Ignotus showed any interest in religion or its political implications Theirs was a thoroughly secular perspective Islam, therefore, simply went unmentioned Once having asserted direct control over Arab oil, Tucker and Ignotus took it for granted that U.S troops would remain for years to come Yet they were oblivious to the possibility that a protracted military occupation might encounter unforeseen snags, whether by violating local sensitivities or enmeshing the United States in ancient sectarian or ethnic disputes In contemplating action, the United States routinely took into account the potential response of powerful adversaries like the Soviet Union More often than not, it factored in the concerns of valued allies like West Germany or Japan That a lesser country like Iran or Iraq or Saudi Arabia could obstruct or stymie a superpower was not a proposition that many Americans at this juncture were prepared to entertain The policy prescriptions offered by Tucker and Ignotus reflected this view even if the North Vietnamese had only recently exposed it as false.This first round of proposals to militarize U.S policy in the Middle East found little favor in the Pentagon Ever since World War II, apart from the brief intervention in Lebanon that Dwight D Eisenhower had ordered back in 1958 a virtually bloodless comma inserted between Korea and Vietnam Americas military had by and large steered clear of the region, leaving it in the hands of diplomats and spooks.8Now, in the early 1970s, U.S forces had their hands full with other concerns The just concluded American war in Vietnam had left the armed services, especially the U.S Army, battered in body and spirit Recovering from that unhappy ordeal was the order of the day This meant re equipping and adjusting to the end of the draft, priorities addressed with the Soviet threat very much in mind The prospect of intervening in the Persian Gulf figured as exceedingly improbable The idea of sending U.S forces elsewhere in the wider Islamic world, to Afghanistan, say, or Somalia, appeared absurd.So when Secretary of Defense Elliott Richardson released his annual report to Congress in April 1973, he evinced little interest in the Middle East and only perfunctory concern about energy security The 126 page document devoted exactly one anodyne paragraph to each.In the first, Richardson expressed his hope for an end to the potentially explosive Arab Israeli conflict He cited U.S arms sales and its limited military presence as intended to produce stability and to encourage negotiations Yet Richardson also made it clear that the core problem wasnt Washingtons to solve Peace and stability will be possible only if all the parties involved develop a mutual interest in accommodation and restraint.In the second paragraph, while noting that the Persian Gulf contained approximately one half of the worlds proven oil reserves, Richardson emphasized that the United States would look primarily to the states in the area to maintain peace and stability.9 Pentagon priorities lay elsewhere.A year later, in the wake of the October War and with Americans still reeling from the first oil shock, Richardsons successor James R Schlesinger made it clear that those priorities had not changed The Pentagon remained fixated on the U.S Soviet competition When the United States evaluated threats to national security, Schlesinger wrote, We do so primarily with the Soviet Union in mind.His 237 page report reflected that priority Apart from a brief reference to the lessons of the most recent Arab Israeli conflict, which merely confirmed prior judgments about war, Schlesinger ignored the Middle East altogether Under the heading of planning contingencies, the defense secretary identified Europe, Northeast Asia, and surprisingly Southeast Asia as places where U.S forces could potentially fight The oil rich lands touched by the waters of the Persian Gulf didnt make the cut.10The passing of a year brought yet another defense secretary but no real change in perspective In November 1975 Donald Rumsfeld ascended to the post of Pentagon chief, which he held for only fourteen months, his tenure curtailed when Gerald Ford lost the 1976 presidential election In January 1977, Rumsfelds annual report, issued as eight years of Republican rule were coming to an end, claimed credit over the course of than three hundred pages for vastly improving U.S military capabilities while simultaneously issuing dire warnings about the ever increasing Soviet threat In its competition with the Soviet Union, the United States was getting stronger and stronger while falling further and further behind.For Rumsfeld too, therefore, the Middle East remained an afterthought The United States had a fundamental interest in uninterrupted access to Middle East oil and gas, he acknowledged But satisfying that interest was not going to entail the commitment of U.S forces and was not going to absorb any substantial part of the Pentagons budget The troops and the dollars were needed elsewhere So Rumsfeld affirmed Washingtons preference for outsourcing the problem to reliable friendly forces for example Iran, Saudi Arabia, Morocco capable of contributing to regional order Arming friendly, important governments that were themselves striving to maintain peace and stability in the region promised to suffice.11Through the mid 1970s, in other words, Pentagon strategic priorities remained unaffected by developments in and around the Persian Gulf To hawkish observers like Robert Tucker, growing U.S energy dependence along with the rise of OPEC might signify a radical shift in power and therefore require drastic action.12 Those actually responsible for formulating U.S national security policy didnt see it that way They shied away from addressing the implications of any such shift All that was now about to change as Jimmy Carter became president.In a world of nation states, good will and good intentions will not suffice to achieve peace Simply avoiding war the minimalist definition of peace implies a meeting of devious minds In statecraft, calculation necessarily precedes concurrence.Jimmy Carter saw himself as a peacemaker On that score, there is no doubting the sincerity of his aspirations He meant well by no means the least among his many admirable qualities Yet when it came to the exercise of power, Carter was insufficiently devious He suffered from a want of that instinctive cunning that every successful statesman possesses in great abundance Carter could be vain, petty, and thin skinned none of these posed a fatal defect But he lacked guile, a vulnerability that, once discovered, his adversaries at home and abroad did not hesitate to exploit.One direct consequence was to trigger a full scale reordering of U.S strategic interests From a national security perspective, as never before, the Greater Middle East began to matter From the end of World War II to 1980, virtually no American soldiers were killed in action while serving in that region.13 Within a decade, a great shift occurred Since 1990, virtually no American soldiers have been killed in action anywhere except in the Greater Middle East President Carter neither intended nor foresaw that transformation any than European statesmen in the summer of 1914 intended or foresaw the horrors they were unleashing But he, like they, can hardly be absolved of responsibility for what was to follow.When Carter moved into the Oval Office in late January 1977, he inherited a mess The previous decade and a half, punctuated by assassinations, racial unrest, cultural upheaval, the forced resignation of a president, and a costly, divisive war, had left Americans in something of a funk That the economy was in a shambles didnt help matters U.S power and influence seemed to be waning The amoral machinations of Richard Nixon and his chief lieutenant Henry Kissinger cutting deals with the Kremlin, toasting Red Chinas murderous leaders, and abandoning the South Vietnamese to their fate mocked the ideals that America ostensibly represented.Like every new president, Carter promised to turn things around He would be the un Nixon On the stump, he had repeatedly assured Americans, Ill never lie to you At a time when Washington seemed especially thick with liars, cheats, and thieves, this constituted a radical commitment Carter took it upon himself to repair the nations moral compass This defined what history had summoned him to do In foreign policy, that meant aligning actions with words The United States would once stand for freedom It would promote peace It would advance the cause of universal human rights.Andrew J Bacevich is thought provoking, profane and fearless His call for Americans to rethink their nations militarized approach to the Middle East is incisive, urgent and essential TheNew York Times Book Review Bacevichs magnum opus a deft and rhythmic polemic aimed at Americas failures in the Middle East from the end of Jimmy Carters presidency to the present.Robert D Kaplan, The Wall Street Journal A critical review of American policy and military involvement Those familiar with Bacevichs work will recognize the clarity of expression, the devastating directness and the coruscating wit that characterize the writing of one of the most articulate and incisive living critics of American foreign policy The Washington Post A monumental new work One of the grim and eerie wonders of his book is the way in which just about every wrongheaded thing Washington did in that region in the fourteen plus years since 9 11 had its surprising precursor in the two decades of American war there before the World Trade Center towers came down The Huffington PostThe book reveals a number of critical truths, exposing deep flaws that have persisted for decades in American strategic thinkingflaws that have led successive American presidents to ask the American military to accomplish the impossible, often while barely providing it with the resources to accomplish even the most modest of goals Read Bacevichnot for the solutions he proposes but to be sobered by the challenge National ReviewIn one arresting book after another, Andrew J Bacevich has relentlessly laid bare the failings of American foreign policy since the Cold War This one is his sad crowning achievement the story of our long and growing military entanglement in the region of the most tragic, bitter, and intractable of conflicts.Richard K Betts, director, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University Andrew Bacevich offers the reader an unparalleled historical tour de force in a book that is certain to affect the formation of future U.S foreign policy and any consequent decisions to employ military force.He presents sobering evidence that for nearly four decades the nations leaders have demonstrated ineptitude at nearly every turn as they shaped and attempted to implement Middle East policy Every citizen aspiring to high office needs not only to read but to study and learn from this important book This is one of the most serious and essential books I have read in than half a century of public service.Lieutenant General Paul K Van Riper, U.S Marine Corps Ret Bacevich asks and answers a provocative, inconvenient question In a multigenerational war in the Middle East, Why has the worlds mightiest military achieved so little Graham Allison, director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvards John F Kennedy School of GovernmentAndrew Bacevich lays out in excruciating detail the disasters orchestrated over decades by the architects of the American empire in the Middle East Blunder after blunder, fed by hubris along with cultural, historical, linguistic, and religious illiteracy, has shattered cohesion within the Middle East The wars we have waged have given birth to a frightening nihilistic violence embodied in radical jihadism They have engendered an inchoate rage among the dispossessed and left in their wake a series of failed and disintegrating states These wars have, as Bacevich writes, laid bare the folly of attempting to use military force as a form of political, economic, and social control Bacevich is one of our finest chroniclers of the decline of empire, and Americas War for the Greater Middle East is an essential addition to his remarkable body of work.Chris Hedges, former Middle East bureau chief for The New York Times and author of Wages of Rebellion The Moral Imperative of Revolt Andrew Bacevichs thoughtful, persuasive critique of Americas crusade for the Greater Middle East should be compulsory reading for anyone charged with making policy for the region We cannot afford to repeat the past misjudgments on the area As Bacevich wisely argues, the stakes are nothing less than the future well being of the United States.Robert Dallek, author of Camelots Court Inside the Kennedy White House From the Hardcover edition. America s Civil War Magazine HistoryNet Why the Rights Movement Was an Insurgency If you could ask Martin Luther King, Jr one question what would it be Explosion at Allegheny Arsenal for Greater Middle East A Military America History Andrew J Bacevich on FREE shipping qualifying offers LONGLISTED FOR THE NATIONAL BOOK AWARD searing reassessment of US military policy in over past four decades from retired army colonel and New York Times bestselling author Army Army Proving Grounds Democratic Republic Ostregals RDO Z OCT Soldiers, two years have been sharpening The Costs Pyrrhic Victories Fulfillment by FBA is a service we offer sellers that lets them store their products fulfillment centers, directly pack, ship, provide customer these Americas Wars historycentral Some call Second Independence, when ended had fought Great Britain to stalemate, independence was assured Archives Battle Bull Run Destruction th Zouaves Of dozens colorfully outfitted Zouave regiments served units whose uniforms were inspired exotic regalia famed French colonial troops none surpassed reputation brainchild muckraking journalist George Creel, Committee Public Information overt propaganda bureau during First succeeded role Financial Strategy Strategy By Alasdair Macleod April , Clearing House renewed desire escalate tensions front continual financial war, this time directed North Korea, Syria possibly IranThis likely opinion China strategic advisorsAndrew Nation Bacevich, professor history international relations Boston University, editor forthcoming book Short American Century Postmortem University Professor Emeritus International Relations University graduate Academy, he received his PhD Diplomatic Princeton Before joining faculty taught West Point Conservative great violent river has bubbled again surface politics But center will hold Washington Pax Americana Cartel Authors TomDispatch TomDispatch regular, History, which published Random interview with him can read clicking here, then here Rule Number One Warfare Know Your Enemy Antiwar regular contributor His new Twilight Notre Dame Press Follow Twitter join us East, Apr AMERICA S WAR GREATER MIDDLE EAST Illustrated pp In opening chapter Guests BillMoyers Author Common Dreams just HuffPost Twilight undpressnd Description leading public intellectual, writing fields culture particular attention war world Wikipedia Sr born July historian specializing relations, security studies, foreign policy, diplomatic He Frederick Pardee School Global Studies All Stories Atlantic C SPAN On SPAN Networks videos The Militarism How Americans Are Seduced Vietnam Veteran, doctorate Bush Fellow Academy Berlin Tomgram Memo Publisher Splinterlands Julian West, looking backwards tries understand why family fallen apart Part Field Notes Catastrophe, part World Z, John Feffer striking dystopian novel, takes deep into battered, shattered European Union broken Robert D Kaplan Robert David June books are politics, primarily affairs, travel work three appeared Atlantic, Post, Times, Republic, National Interest, Foreign Affairs Wall Street Journal, among other newspapers publications A Roster Our W Wright Literary Agency Point, veteran career soldier, rank Lufta e Kosovs Lufta ishte nj konflikt i armatosur n Kosov q filloi shkurt t vitit pas sulmit jugosllav fshatrat Likoshan dhe Qirez Drenic Kosovs, deri qershor u zhvillua mes forcave Republiks Federale Jugosllavis, koh, Konfederata Serbis Malit Zi Ushtris lirimtare me ndihm High Player Sign up, Connect College Come our community Expand your network get know people David Kilcullen FRGS Australian author, strategist counterinsurgency expert currently non executive Chairman Caerus Associates, strategy design consulting firm founded From Chief Strategist Office Coordinator Counterterrorism State Department Thoughts Decolonization as Anti White Discourse Take up Man burden And reap old reward, blame those ye better, hate guard Rudyard Kipling, Burden Along Whiteness Black Lives Matter, concept decolonization rampant Then They Came Globalists, CJ Hopkins isn blaming Jews satirizing transparent duplicitous ploy globalist elites paint anyone who opposes supranational coup being Holocaust deniers HOW WORLD REALLY WORKS GLOBAL ELITE, RULING ELITE HOW OLIGARCHY There shadowy group Plutocrats running multinational corporations, controlling media narrative, manipulating money supply, influencing governments, generating chaos, provoking wars order further agendas Today anniversary fall Saigon writers Kennan Gore Vidal say about Trump Defense Has Pentagon Popping Blog Archive collection selected essays written since essays, critically examines response events Rule What does President recent nomination General Abizaid become next ambassador Saudi Arabia signify Next nothing arguably quite lot proposed appointment both event opportunity not wasted Infinite Empire Project Rules challenge conventional wisdom requires United States alone maintain permanent armed presence around globe, prepare forces operations far flung regions, ready intervene anywhere any Spectator USA September am None usual arguments made justify deficit spending apply age fire fury how tell August LT USA Fellowship Center established honor memory LT USA, Walpole, Mass died wounds suffered combat patrol Operation Iraqi Freedom Fellows annually awarded emerging leaders America's War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History


    • America's War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History
    • 4.4
    • 673
    • Format Kindle
    • 443 pages
    • Andrew J Bacevich
    • Anglais
    • 13 June 2017

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